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U.S.–Mexico Remittances: 




nternational migration can be costly to a country in terms of the loss of 
human capital. In the case of massive out-migration, such as what Mexico 
has experienced over the past thirty years or so, the losses can be staggering. 
It is estimated that about 8 million Mexican-born workers—15 percent of the 
Mexican-born labor force—are in the United States.
The loss of labor results in a smaller economy, and aggregate income falls. 
However, it is not clear whether income per capita declines as a result of out-
migration. That depends largely on who leaves. Remittances—migrants’ money 
transfers to the families they have left behind—provide a migration offset that 
helps maintain income and consumption in the home country. 
As  the  papers  from  this  panel  illustrate,  remittances  offer  many  bene-
fits, both to recipient households, as Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes’ work shows, 
and  to  the  larger  local  economy,  as  Ed  Taylor  demonstrates.  Taylor  stud-
ies migration and remittances in a general-equilibrium context and finds that 
the multiplier effects of remittances are large (Taylor et al. 1996). This finding 
partly answers critics who complain that remittances that go to consumption   
do not have the same beneficial impact as remittances directed to investment. 
New research has even shown that remittances can help build financial mar-
kets. In the Mexican case, the process of remitting has sown the seed of fi-
nancial  intermediation  in  small  communities  that  might  otherwise  have  little   
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Dilip Ratha argues that given the benefits of remittances, taxing or otherwise creat-
ing barriers to legal international money transfers makes for bad public policy. 
The rest of this commentary explores recent trends in U.S.–Mexico remit-
tances, explaining how they are measured and comparing them with forecasts of 
remittances based on an econometric model and with trends in other developing 
countries.  
Growth in U.S. Remittances to Mexico 
The panel’s compelling research on the development impact of remittances 
relies overwhelmingly on microdata collected through household surveys in mi-
grants’ home countries. For data on total remittance flows between countries, 
however, researchers, the government, and the media rely on official statistics. In 
the case of Mexico, the central bank is the best source of remittance data.
Banco de México data indicate both high levels and growth of remittances in 
the past decade. In fact, the volume and growth rate seen in these official data 
are much higher than what is implied by household survey data on senders and 
receivers and by other measures, such as remittance estimates from the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce. 
According to Banco de México, remittances totaled $20 billion in 2005 and 
by 2006 had grown to $23.1 billion. The 2006 level was 375 percent higher in real 
terms than 1995 remittances. In the post-2000 period, average annual growth was 
a remarkable 20.4 percent. 
Many factors drive remittance growth, while others curtail it. As migrants 
spend more time away from home, for example, remittances generally fall, par-
ticularly if migrants take their families with them or form new families in the 
destination country. Drivers of growth, on the other hand, include increases in 
the migrant population and its income, declines in money transfer costs, and a 
currency depreciation or an economic crisis in the home country.   
Several of these factors have been pushing up Mexican remittance totals, but 
they can’t fully explain the recent growth. As real remittances grew 170 percent 
between 2000 and 2005, for example, the Mexican-born population in the U.S. 
grew 20 percent and real median weekly earnings of U.S. Hispanics rose 18 per-
cent. Meanwhile, migrant inflows are estimated to have fallen in 2001, 2002, and 
2003 as the U.S. economy entered recession and then experienced a weak labor 
market recovery (Passel and Suro 2005). In addition, in-migration in 2005 was 
estimated to have been below 2000 levels, and the dollar rose only 7.4 percent 
against the peso during these years. For remittance drivers, the biggest change 
came in the transaction cost of money transfers, with average costs falling more 
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In sum, with the possible exception of transaction costs, it is difficult to rec-
oncile the remittance growth pattern with underlying economic and demographic 
variables. But there is a third factor that may be the single most important deter-
minant of the increases in observed remittances: better measurement. 
Measuring Remittances
In 2000, Banco de México launched a major overhaul of the collection and 
recording of remittance data. Efforts initially focused on better recordkeeping 
within the central bank and then on better collection from sources outside the 
bank (Cervantes 2007). To this end, in October 2002, Banco de México issued 
rules under which all banks and money transfer companies had to register with 
the central bank and report monthly remittances by Mexican state of destina-
tion. Before 2003, monthly remittance levels were inferred from a 1990 census 
of financial institutions, money exchange houses, and wire transfer companies. 
The result of the reporting requirement was much improved data collection and 
a clear break with past trends in remittance numbers.
Figure 1 shows monthly U.S.–Mexico remittance data in 2006 dollars. In line 
with the measurement changes, the growth rate of remittances appears to have 
roughly three phases: 1995 to 2000, 2000 to 2002, and 2002 to 2006.1 After 2002, 
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the series clearly shows more rapid growth and greater seasonality. 
In addition to mandatory direct reporting by money transfer firms, Banco de 
México also incorporates remittances that go through informal channels. Every 
December, the central bank conducts a border survey that asks returning migrants 
questions about cash and goods they are bringing to relatives. 
With the border survey and migrants’ increased use of formal channels for 
transmitting remittances, the cash migrants carried home in the past is now being 
captured by the official statistics. So better measurement of remittances has itself 
contributed significantly to the growth rate observed in recent years. 
The main reason for the move from informal to formal channels has been the 
decline in transaction costs for both senders and recipients (Freund and Spatafora 
2005). Greater competition and enhanced technology have driven down costs. 
More than 100 money transfer organizations served Mexico in 2005, compared 
with only five in 1995 (Mascaró 2007). Technological innovations like debit and 
credit cards and low-cost options like the Federal Reserve’s automated clearing-
house system (Directo a México) have further reduced costs. As a result, elec-
tronic transfers rose from 53 percent of remittances in 1996 to 85.8 percent in 
2003 and 93 percent by 2006 (Cervantes 2007; Coronado 2004). 
U.S. Government Data on U.S.–Mexico Remittances
There are other sources of information on remittance flows to Mexico, and 
some of their estimates differ starkly from the Banco de México’s numbers. The 
U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates that   
remittances were $10.7 billion in 2005 and $11.1 billion in 2006—roughly half 
the official volume. Figure 2, which compares annual remittance data from the 
BEA and Banco de México, shows the two series diverging after 2002. The timing 
coincides with the central bank’s adoption of the new measurement methodol-
ogy, but the BEA and Banco de México have always used different remittance 
estimation techniques. 
BEA estimation is not based on direct reporting by banks and other fund 
transfer companies but on a model built on assumptions about remittance behav-
ior and estimates of the size and characteristics of the migrant population. The 
BEA methodology has the advantage of being low cost, and it includes transfers 
sent through both informal and formal channels. However, it is highly sensitive to 
assumptions about who is remitting and how much they are sending. In addition, 
while the BEA defines remittances as transfers by migrants who have been in the 
U.S. for at least one year, one report suggests the BEA model may capture some 
of the initial transfers (U.S. General Accountability Office 2006). In any case, the 
exclusion is not large enough to account for the difference between the BEA data 
and the official, Banco de México numbers. And given recent growth rates in such 
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model-based estimate will clearly not generate the double-digit growth official 
measures have documented. 
Microdata on Remittances 
In addition to government, or macro, measures of remittances, there are sur-
vey-based, or micro, measures of remittances by senders and receivers. Esquivel 
and Huerta-Pineda (2005) discuss recipient-based measures from a large, nation-
ally representative household survey in Mexico called ENIGH (Encuesta Nacional 
de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares). ENIGH data report that in 2002, 1.4 million 
households received an average of $2,560. Based on this, remittances to Mexico 
totaled $3.6 billion in 2002, only 37 percent of the official estimate.
Some Mexican officials have questioned the discrepancy between the mi-
crodata, from such sources as ENIGH, and official remittance estimates. They 
contend the Banco de México methodology does not do enough to exclude illicit 
business transactions, such as payments to human smugglers and drug traffickers, 
or legitimate nonfamily transfers, such as donations to nonprofit organizations 
(Muñoz 2006).  
Sender-based microdata on the quantity of remittances also differ from official 
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estimates. Amuedo-Dorantes finds that in Mexican Migration Project (MMP) data, 
79 percent of Mexican workers in the U.S. remit an average of $350 per month. If 
migrants in the MMP were representative of Mexicans in the U.S., these numbers 
would be consistent with official remittance estimates of more than $20 billion. 
Of course, MMP is a survey of return migrants with characteristics that distinguish 
them from Mexican immigrants in general. MMP migrants tend to be experienced 
migrants who maintain households in Mexico while they work temporarily in the 
U.S. and send or carry very large percentages of their incomes back home. They 
are poorer and have less education than Mexicans on average and tend to come 
from states with established migrant networks in the U.S. In sum, it would not be 
prudent to apply the characteristics of MMP migrants to the Mexican population 
in the U.S., which is more affluent but also has fewer ties to home.
A Model of Remittances
The BEA and microdata cannot replicate the trends found in the remittance 
data from Banco de México in the post-2002 period. What would a macroeco-
nomic forecast based on official data before the measurement changes predict for 
this period? To explore this question, we construct an autoregressive integrated 
moving average model (ARIMA) of quarterly remittances as a function of several 
macroeconomic variables, including U.S. and Mexican GDP, the dollar–peso ex-
change rate, the U.S. Consumer Price Index, and maquiladora employment. We 
difference the data to ensure stationarity and use autocorrelation functions to esti-
mate the lagged structure of each variable and the residuals vis-à-vis remittances. 
Then we run the model of remittances on its determinants and lagged values of 
itself, including current and lagged values of independent variables and allowing 
for the appropriate ARIMA structure of the residuals. A forecast is generated by 
projecting the fitted values of remittances as of fourth quarter 2002. 
The results, together with remittances and BEA estimates, are shown in Fig-
ure 3. Interestingly, macroeconomic determinants plus lagged remittances can 
explain most of the gap between BEA and Banco de México estimates. The model 
predicts that remittances would have been $21.5 billion in 2006, only about $1.5 
billion short of the actual number. The central bank’s new methodology, discussed 
above, and the decline in transactions costs more than account for the shortfall. 
Adding control variables to capture the effect of the post-2002 change suggests 
the impact of the new methodology amounted to $700 million at most in 2006.2 
Estimates of the cost elasticity of remittances suggest that the decline in transfer 
costs between 2000 and 2005 likely boosted 2006 transfers by $1.5 billion.3219  Commentary on Session III
Comparing Remittances Across Countries
Remittances have been rising worldwide, and other countries’ experiences 
are helpful for putting the Mexican case into context. Mexico’s double-digit an-
nual growth rates are not unusual. Figure 4 shows an indexed series of real re-
mittances from 1994 to 2005 for a group of developing countries, many of which 
have experienced growth rates as high as or higher than Mexico. According 
to International Financial Statistics data, remittances more than doubled in real 
terms in India, Mexico, the Philippines, China, Bangladesh, Poland, Colombia, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, and Jamaica, among other countries.4 
Conclusion
There is no doubt that remittances to Mexico are high and have grown quick-
ly. What factors are driving the rapid growth are less well known, particularly 
since microdata and other sources are out of line with official statistics. This situ-
ation is not unique to Mexico. As we have seen, remittances to many developing 
countries have more than doubled over the past decade, far outpacing changes in 
demographic or economic fundamentals.
Better measurement is the most important factor underlying changes in the 
data. At the same time formal transfers are being better measured, informal trans-
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fers are shrinking as migrants increase their use of formal channels. The switch 
is due to many factors, but none as important as the sharply falling cost of remit-
ting. 
Remittance data have historically been of poor quality and grossly underesti-
mated migrant transfers. To remedy this, a global effort is under way to standard-
ize the definition and measurement of remittances. This will facilitate cross-coun-
try comparisons and analysis as well as appropriate policy responses to growing 
transfer flows.
Given the significance of remittances to the home country, precise measure-
ment is extremely important. Governments need accurate measures of where 
remittances are going and how large they are to track the impact on the poor and 
better target social programs, infrastructure improvements, and financial indus-
try regulation. In Mexico, several government matching programs leverage the 
power of remittances to improve conditions through investment in schools and 
infrastructure. 
Remittances give rise to policy issues in the host country as well. A crucial is-
sue is financial access for immigrants, particularly those who are undocumented. 
Governments struggle with trying to block illicit money flows that may go to ter-
rorist groups or other criminals, while at the same time allowing immigrants ac-
cess to banks. As measurement and standardization issues are resolved, the policy 
issues will surely come to dominate the debate over remittances.
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Notes
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas or Federal Reserve System.
1  The average annual growth rate in each period was 10.3 percent, 16 percent, and 20.6 percent, 
respectively.
2  To approximate the effect of the change in methodology, we fully interacted the model with a 
postchange dummy variable that takes the value 1 starting in fourth quarter 2002.
3  The cost elasticity of remittances is assumed to be –0.4, as reported in Freund and Spatafora 
(2005).
4  Data for India are available only through 2003.
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